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1. Introduction 
One of the few generalizations that can safely be made of India is that its individual 
states differ widely in their physical, cultural and economic characteristics.  States differ by size, 
population, geographic and demographic endowments, their level of development, rural/urban 
mix, and ethnic and religious composition all of which have produced broadly different types, 
levels and distributions of income.  On the other hand, governance structures across Indian 
states share a common political heritage derived from British parliamentary government.  
Hence in comparing election and governing institutions across Indian states one is not 
comparing political apples and oranges.  Rather this combination of distinctive and common 
features means that the governance structures of Indian states provide an important arena for 
the testing different public choice hypotheses, hypotheses whose common feature is that 
governance structures should respond to differences in their specific political and economic 
environments.   
In this paper we focus on a subset of differences across states and examine the extent 
to which these find expression in different manifestations of political competition as embodied 
in state budgets.  To foreshadow our argument, we expect to find that electoral competition 
will lead governments in low income states to provide relatively more of their expenditures as 
private goods, targeted specifically at the core supporters of, and the swing voters available to, 
the governing party.  In such states providing special interest groups with relatively small valued 
gifts will generate benefits that bulk large relative to existing incomes and this bigger ‘bang for 
the buck’ makes targeted expenditures a relatively more productive way to win or retain 
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electoral support for the incumbent political party.  While targeted spending serves to establish 
a reputation or brand name for the incumbent party seeking special interest support, Krishna 
(2007) discusses a number of ways by which leaders of these groups can solicit support by 
credibly delivering group votes to the governing party.     
As income levels rise, however, the additional benefit received by a group of voters 
from the same nominal sized gift can be expected to fall. This implies that the level of political 
support that can be won by a governing party making special interest transfers will fall relative 
to the ability to win support from the general public by providing either more or better qualities 
of public goods.  The ability of the governing party to win political support through targeted 
private spending becomes increasingly costly relative to the alternative of providing good 
governance by enhancing welfare more generally.  For these reasons we expect that the form 
of political competition in the richest states to be characterized more by the provision of public 
goods, goods aimed at benefiting the community as a whole, relative to the individualism of 
specifically targeted private goods.  For the same reason, this pattern of change should hold 
within all states across time as income levels rise.  At any particular point in time, however, an 
increase in political competition will produce greater intensity in the particular form of political 
competition currently practiced.  Thus while both poor and rich states respond by increasing 
the provision of both types of publically provided goods, poorer states will increasingly be 
characterized by the intensity of their targeted expenditures. In richer states, greater 
competition can be expected to result in a greater expansion of public services that more 
broadly enhance state economic welfare.  
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Because we are not the first to be concerned with special interest spending as a form of 
political competition nor are we the first to test for its presence, our contribution to this 
ongoing debate needs to be highlighted.1 Here we argue that the essential element needed to 
test the hypotheses outlined above is a credible distinction between state provided private 
goods and public welfare enhancing provided goods that utilizes state fiscal data.  Our 
contribution is to provide an explicit model of how targeted private spending works as a form of 
political competition and more precise and specific measures of what targeted spending means 
in the context of state expenditures.   
Because agreement on a unique measure seems unlikely, we propose three ever tighter 
measures of private versus public state expenditures.  The first defines targeted spending 
conventionally as the ratio of state consumption expenditure to total state expenditure net of 
interest.  Although this measure is relatively crude, it has been widely used and its 
categorization of targeted spending in terms of broad spending aggregates means that it could 
be used for the relatively long 1959 to 2013 time period.  The second measure defines targeted 
spending somewhat more selectively in terms of the greater budget detail that becomes 
available from 1972/73 onward. The third and most selective measure uses an item by item 
reclassification of state expenditures.  This takes advantage of the greater detail permitted by 
the line budgets released in state budget documents following the 1987-88 budget year.  More 
detail on the precise items included as targeted expenditures is given in the Data Appendix of 
                                                          
1 Much of the literature conflates what we are calling targeted private spending with clientism (see Hicken, 2011; 
Robinson and Verdier, 2013). In our view clientism is much more restrictive than targeted special interest 
spending, requiring the existence of an (implicit) contractual relationship between a political party promising 
government assistance in return for the legislative support of a specific group. Its measure thus requires evidence 
of how political promises can be enforced feasibly. In our analysis targeted spending is focused more generally on 
private goods that can be directed at special interest groups who can be expected to support the governing party. 
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the paper.  Given these alternative categorizations, we expect that more precision in the items 
included in the private/public expenditure split will allow the predictions of the political 
competition hypotheses to stand out more cleanly in the data.  The particular hypotheses we 
are interested in testing include: does the form of electoral competition work as suggested 
through targeted private relative to public government output falling as individual incomes 
rise?; can electoral competition explain any of the differences arising across rich versus poor 
states?; and does higher income affect the public/private output mix in the same way as 
political competition?  That is, are income levels and political competition complements or 
substitutes as a way of explaining the mix of public sector output?   
Before answering any of these questions, however, we begin with a model that 
motivates the analysis and leads to the questions outlined above.  It formalizes how we view 
and propose measuring political competition and answers why we expect higher income levels 
to change the form of political competition.  This is operationalized by the effect of income on 
the mix of private and publically supplied government output. 
2. An election model featuring targeted private spending on core and swing voters in 
 which rents play a key role 
In the following pages we develop an election model with core and swing voters in the 
spirit of Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), Cox and McCubbins (1986), Dixit and Longregan (1996), 
Lohmann (1998), Golden and Picci (2008), Weitz-Shapiro (2012), Aidt and Mooney (2014) and 
others .  The setup of the model is tailored to focus on the consequences of the level of 
development and the degree of political completion for the public--private good mix of 
government policy. 
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Typically a political party’s probability of electoral success depends upon its ability to 
attract swing voters in addition to its own core supporters. Swing voters are assumed to be 
uninterested in the party-specific ideas that motivate the party’s core supporters and vote 
purely in response to the levels of private goods, 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡, and public goods, 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡, received from 
competing political parties.  Core supporters, on the other hand, are party partisans but only up 
to a point. That is, they will not vote for another party until a threshold level of promised 
individual benefit greater than 𝑞𝑞0 is passed. This we assume is exogenously given.2  We assume 
that the initial division of the electorate into core and swing voters depends on factors outside 
of the party’s control (such as demographics) though this may change over time for various 
reasons.  Normalizing the size of the electorate to one, the number of swing voters is 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠 and 
the number of core supporters is 𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 where k is the number of political parties and 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠 + 𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 =1.  For simplicity we assume that within each voting group members are identical and that core 
and swing voters differ only in the manner described above.  While the fraction of swing voters 
may be small, they are often of strategic importance.   
Assume then that each political party is interested in maximizing its political support in 
the next election where political support depends in part upon the private benefits, 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡, and 
public goods, 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡, provided to swing voters.  In addition, political support will depend on the 
support given by its core supporters.  This in turn requires the provision of a threshold level of 
specific private benefits to maintain party loyalty, 𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑞𝑞0 and the commitment by the party to 
                                                          
2 Use of a threshold means that core voters will become swing voters only if a large enough level of private benefit 
is given by competing political parties to overcome party attachment and we reflect this by assuming that 𝑞𝑞0 > 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡 .  
In our empirical work, we allow for control variables, such as the percentage of voters who are SC or ST, to reflect 
the size and commitment of the core group,  
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transfer to them any rents, 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡, that can be generated from governing, where to confer any of 
these benefits the party must first win the election.  Rents are defined as potential government  
output, 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡, used neither to provide private goods targeted at the groups of swing and core 
voters, 𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡 = 𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑞𝑞0 + 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡, nor to provide public goods, 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡. Hence rents are a residual. If present 
they are used to promote the partisan interests of core party supporters and functionaries.  
This implies that 
 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 = 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 − 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡 − 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡,        (1) 
where 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 is the relative cost of using government output to acquire political support using 
private state provided goods relative to public goods providing more general welfare. The cost 
of using specifically targeted private goods to generate electoral support is assumed to increase 
in the level of development (per capita income) encountered in any political jurisdiction.  Hence 
as average income levels rise, increasing quantities of the publically provided private good must 
be given to accomplish the same electoral objective.  
Potential voters of all types are assumed to recognize the general structure of the 
electoral process in that voters expect that political parties will provide some special level of 
inducement to swing voters and redistribute rents to their core supporters.  However, following 
Lohman (1998), Besley, Persson and Strum (2010) and Aidt and Mooney (2014) costly 
information means that swing voters will be unable to determine the specific levels of this 
support.  Less than full information arises because voters are assumed to be able to observe 
only the aggregate level of public government goods actually provided, what will later be called 
𝐺𝐺𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚, the level of individual tax payments, 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡, and the specific level of private goods they 
receive, either 𝑞𝑞0 or 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡.   
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To model the information problem more explicitly we assume that the level of 
government services that can be produced from any level of tax revenue depends on the ability 
or competence of the governing party, 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚, and the realization of a common time specific 
productivity shock, 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡.  More explicitly, 
𝐺𝐺𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 = 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 where 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡~𝑁𝑁(1,𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2) and 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚~𝑁𝑁(𝑎𝑎�,𝜎𝜎𝑎𝑎2),     (2) 
and where 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 is the tax revenue used to produce government goods and services.3  It is because 
voters cannot observe the competence of the governing party in the presence of the 
productivity shock that voters will be unable to determine precisely the potential services they 
could get from their taxes and hence the degree to which the governing party can divert 
government output to swing voters and/or its core supporters. This allows the party (knowing 
its own competence) to use information compactness to disguise the transfer of rents to its 
core supporters.  Voters for their part will attempt to infer the competence of the governing 
party from its realized level of performance and, in order to constrain rent-seeking, will 
establish a minimal level of performance as the basis for voting for the governing party in the 
upcoming election.   
To construct a minimally acceptable level of performance, swing voters use their ability 
to observe actual output, 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡 and 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 together with their knowledge of the structure of the 
system.  In the absence of other metrics, swing voters will view the ability/competence of any 
political party that is competing with the governing party as being a random draw from the 
distribution of party abilities (assumed to be normally distributed with mean 𝑎𝑎� and constant 
                                                          
3 Hence even though political parties see the possibility of gaining political support symmetrically, they differ by 
their ability/competence in producing government services. 
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variance, 𝜎𝜎𝑎𝑎2).  Thus from the voter’s perspective it is the presence of the two random effects 
that prevents them from determining precisely the competence of the governing party and 
establishes the level of performance that can be expected from a randomly drawn rival as the 
effective operational constraint on what the governing party must provide from its tax 
revenues.  This implicitly defines what the incumbent can extract as rents for its core 
supporters.   
We now add specificity to the analysis by adopting a specific functional form that allows 
us to isolate the relative cost of using targeted spending as per capita income rises.  Assume 
that the expected political support that can be received by any political party i is an increasing 
function of the private goods given to both its clients and swing voters, the utility generated by 
government public goods and private consumption that can be realized after taxes, 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 = 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 − 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡, and can be represented by 
𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡[𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡] =  𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡[𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛(𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑞𝑞𝑜𝑜 + 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡) + 𝛼𝛼 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛(𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡) + 𝛾𝛾𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡]     (3) 
where 1 > 𝛼𝛼, 𝛾𝛾,𝛽𝛽 > 0, 𝛾𝛾 = 1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽 are the weights attached to the alternative means of 
gaining electoral support and 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 = 𝑌𝑌 − 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡.4  The political effectiveness of private goods is 
written as 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛(𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑞𝑞𝑜𝑜 + 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡) to reflect the assumption that the support that can be expected 
from core and swing voters increases at a decreasing rate.  The cost in terms of government 
output in purchasing that support is later assumed to be increasing in the state’s level of 
development.  
                                                          
4 Note that although any realized rent generates utility to core voters, rent is not a cost to the party but a residual 
realized by the governing party with an above average level of ability. 
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From the voter’s perspective, the level of ability/competence held by political party j is a 
drawing from the distribution 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚~𝑁𝑁(𝑎𝑎� ,𝜎𝜎𝑎𝑎2) whereas 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡~𝑁𝑁(1,𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2) is a random shock that 
equally affects the provision of government supplied public goods.  Again from the perspective 
of voters, the two drawings are assumed to be independent of each other.  Hence the output 
that could be expected from a randomly drawn alternative to the governing party is 𝐺𝐺𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡
𝑒𝑒 =
𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡) = 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡� = 𝑎𝑎�𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡.  It follows that because the rent received by core supporters 
generates no electoral support but imposes a loss by implying a higher 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 than that needed to 
provide the same level of 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡,𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 (through the government budget constraint), competition 
among otherwise identical political parties will result in the establishment of an expected level 
of performance that will exhaust the ability of the average ability winning party to realize any 
rent.5  That is, given the information held by voters, the performance criteria established will 
result from the optimal output choices of an ‘average’ political party that uses all government 
output for either 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡, 𝑞𝑞0 or 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡, i.e., 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 = 0 so that 𝐺𝐺𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 𝐺𝐺𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 = 𝑎𝑎�𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 =  𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡+ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡(𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑞𝑞0 + 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡).  
Using this information structure and assuming that the two shocks are independent, we can 
substitute the expected value, 𝐺𝐺𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡
𝑒𝑒 , back the production function in (3) together with the 
definitions of 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 and 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 to find the expected support of the average political party as  
𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡[𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡] = β (𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛(𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑞𝑞0 + 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡)) + 𝛼𝛼(𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡) + (1 − 𝛽𝛽 − 𝛼𝛼) 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛(𝑌𝑌 − 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡)  (4) 
Looking at the case where 𝑞𝑞0 > 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡 (so that 𝑞𝑞0, 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠, 𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐  Y remain parameters), the first 
order conditions for an internal maximum of (4), subject to the effective performance 
constraint of 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡{𝜇𝜇𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝜏𝜏} = 𝑎𝑎�𝜏𝜏 =  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡(𝑛𝑛0𝑞𝑞0 + 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠) + 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 are: 
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𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡:  𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚0𝑞𝑞0+𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠 − 𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 = 0,        (5) 
𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡:  𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 − 𝜆𝜆 = 0, and         (6) 
𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡:  - 𝛾𝛾𝑌𝑌−𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 + 𝜆𝜆𝑎𝑎� = 0.        (7) 
To solve for the equilibrium values first combine (5) and (6) to find 
  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡(𝑛𝑛0𝑞𝑞0 + 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠) = 𝛽𝛽𝛼𝛼 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡.        (8) 
Note that since 𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡 =  𝑛𝑛0𝑞𝑞0 + 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠, the ratio of private to publically provided goods 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡 =  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽 
so that the optimal ratio of publically provided private to public goods will rise with the price of 
private goods (which in turn is an increasing function of income).  
Second, by combining (6) and (7) we get 
  𝑎𝑎�𝜏𝜏 = 𝑎𝑎�𝑌𝑌 −  𝛾𝛾
𝛼𝛼
𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡.        (9) 
Substituting (8) and (9) back into the effective performance constraint, the equilibrium level of 
public good provision, 𝑔𝑔∗, and the equilibrium tax,𝜏𝜏∗, can be solved as 
𝑔𝑔∗ =  𝛼𝛼𝑎𝑎�
𝛼𝛼+𝛽𝛽+𝛾𝛾
𝑌𝑌, and  𝜏𝜏∗ = 𝑌𝑌 −  𝛾𝛾(𝛼𝛼+𝛽𝛽+𝛾𝛾)𝑔𝑔∗ = (1−𝛾𝛾)𝑌𝑌(𝛼𝛼+𝛽𝛽+𝛾𝛾)     (10) 
With 𝑔𝑔∗known, the substitution of (10) back into (8) solves for the necessary level of private 
good provision as 
 𝑄𝑄∗ = 𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎�
𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡(𝛼𝛼+𝛽𝛽+𝛾𝛾)𝑌𝑌.         (11) 
Finally, the actual rent that governing party i will realize upon its election in period t will 
depend upon its actual level of competence, 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚, and the realization of the period specific 
productivity shock, 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡.  That is, 
𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 = 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝜏𝜏∗ − 𝑎𝑎�𝜏𝜏∗ = (𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 − 𝑎𝑎�)𝜏𝜏∗.       (12) 
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If rents need not be taken in the form of government provided goods and services, government 
tax revenues will be larger than that needed to provide the observable level of performance 
expected by the community. 
With this background we can now establish three testable predictions that follow from 
our analysis: 
Prediction 1:  Across states an increase in real per capita income will be associated with 
a smaller ratio of targeted private to total state spending as a means of purchasing 
political support. A corollary is that ratio of private targeted spending to public goods 
should have declined over time in states where income has risen. 
 
Proof:  
In our model a reduction in targeted spending means a fall in the ratio of private to 
publically provided government goods and services, that is 𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡
𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡
 must fall.  Then from (11) and (10) 
we find, 
𝜕𝜕�
𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡
𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡
�
𝜕𝜕𝑌𝑌
= − 𝛽𝛽
𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡
2 �
𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝑌𝑌
� < 0.       (13) 
The sign of (13) follows because we assume that 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 is increasing with Y. Thus within each state 
we should find that special interest spending is declining over time as income levels rise.  To the 
extent that other factors can be controlled for, targeted spending should be used more in 
states with lower levels of income. 
Note that the form of the support function used to illustrate this point has the virtue of 
making income neutral in its effect on the proportion of the two types of government goods 
used to win electoral support. This means that the effect on the composition of government 
output arises only from the substitution effect that follows a relative price change and cannot 
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be attributed to the income effect arising from the price change.  On the other hand, the 
disadvantage of using the separable form is that while the relative quantity falls, the 
expenditure share remains constant following a price change, reflecting an imposed elasticity of 
one.  It follows that while the relative use of targeted spending would be expected to fall as the 
rise in income both within and across the Indian states raises its political cost, the expenditure 
share spent on targeted spending would rise rather than fall if the demand curve were inelastic.  
Because the implicit relative price of using targeted private government goods to win political 
support is not observed, empirical tests of these hypotheses must use expenditures shares in 
their stead.  This implies that an expenditure test for the effect of income on the relative use of 
targeted expenditures will be overly restrictive in the sense that real spending could be falling 
even if its expenditure share rose.  While such an outcome does not arise in the empirics below, 
this potential ambiguity should be recognized in interpreting the targeted expenditure 
literature and the empirical work that follows. 
Prediction 2:  The effect of an increase in political competition on the type of political 
competition will depend upon the level of development in the affected state.  Incumbent 
parties in low income states will respond to more competition in the form of relatively 
more targeted spending while rich states will experience less relative to publically 
provided goods. 
 
Proof: 
In the context of our analysis, an increase in the intensity of political competition means 
a truncation in the distribution of competencies/abilities across viable political parties.  That is, 
greater political completion brings the elimination at least one of the least able political parties 
which in turn implies that the (mean) level of ability that can be expected by swing voters from 
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a randomly chosen alternative to the governing party will rise.  From equations (10) and (11) it 
can be seen that both 𝑔𝑔∗and  𝑄𝑄∗ are increasing functions of 𝑎𝑎�, the mean value of competing 
party competence.  From the ratio of (10) and (11) we see that 𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡
𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡
= 𝛽𝛽
𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡
 which implies that the 
proportions by which an expansion in government services takes place will depend only on the 
relative cost of providing the two goods. This in turn is a function of the level of state income.  
Thus when income levels are low (so that the price of acquiring political support through 
targeted spending is low) relatively more of the expansion arising from increased political 
competition will take place through privately targeted government spending.  For rich states 
where the relative cost of using targeted spending is high, expansion will arise relatively more 
in the form of publically provided public goods that enhance economic welfare more generally.6 
Prediction 3:  While the effect of an increase in political competition will involve a change 
in neither the form nor the aggregate level of government spending, an increase in 
political competition will be observed as a fall in the expected number of political parties 
(ENP) and an unobserved fall in the rents received by core party supporters.  The latter 
becomes observable as a fall in the share of private targeted expenditure in the state 
budget.  Hence the model predicts that the sign of the regression coefficient on ENP with 
be positive with respect to its effect on the proportion of privately targeted goods in 
total state expenditures.   
 
Proof: 
From equations (10) and (11) it can be seen that 𝑔𝑔∗ and 𝑄𝑄∗ both increase with 𝑎𝑎�.  On the 
other hand, total government output/expenditure 𝐺𝐺𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 = 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝜏𝜏∗ is independent of 𝑎𝑎� and hence 
                                                          
6 Because 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠 and 𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐  are exogenously fixed proportions, the model does not capture directly the effect across 
states of different total numbers of voters.  Intuitively, however, as the total number of voters rise, the cost of 
using private as opposed to public goods to attract the same proportion of election support must rise. In this sense 
the analysis predicts that as population size rises, the use of targeted relative to more general forms of welfare 
reform will fall. 
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remains constant.  It follows that with the minimally acceptable level of government 
performance  𝐺𝐺𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 𝑎𝑎�𝜏𝜏∗ increasing, the effect of increased political competition is to require 
the incumbent government to use its unchanged tax revenues more efficiently (from the 
perspective of the nonpartisan voter) and so squeeze the rents that would otherwise go to core 
party supporters.  The latter follows directly from (12).  That is, while the aggregate resources 
absorbed by government are unchanged, the share of government services going to noncore 
voters will increase and the rent that can be expected by core party supporters of the 
incumbent political party (with unchanged competence equal to 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚) will fall.  Because rents are 
received in the form of privately targeted public goods, the effect of a fall in ENP (implying 
greater political competition) will be observed as a fall in the ratio of privately targeted public 
expenditures. 
The test of our targeted spending hypothesis can then be written as: 
     � 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇
𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇 𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 𝐺𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃′𝑡𝑡 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒�𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 =  𝑎𝑎0 +  𝑎𝑎1𝑅𝑅𝑌𝑌𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 + 𝑎𝑎2𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 + 𝑎𝑎3𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡,      (14) 
where 𝑖𝑖 = 1, . .14 represents the state, 𝑡𝑡 = 1959, … 2011 represents the year.  In addition, 𝑎𝑎1, 
the coefficient on real per capita income (RYPC), is predicted to be negative; 𝑎𝑎2, the coefficient 
on ENPVOTE (our proxy for political competition) is predicted to be positive; and 𝑎𝑎3, is the 
coefficient on the set of control variables.   
3. Data and some preliminary results 
The data used in our tests comes from a panel of fourteen Indian states for which we 
have annual time series data.  A more complete description of the variables used and their 
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sources is included as a Data Appendix at the end of the paper.  Because our test involves a 
comparison of results for the different measures of the private/public split in state government 
expenditure, we mainly restrict our attention to the 1987/2011 time period, the maximum 
length for which we have our most precise measure, (Private/Public)87.  However, some results 
for longer periods of time using less precise spending measures are also considered.  
 The (Private/Public)87 data for 1987/88 to 2011/12 are graphed in the two figures 
following: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Private state spending to total noninterest state spending, 14 major Indian states 
1987-88 to 2011-12 
 
 
 
Note: For some years certain states spent large amounts on lottery awards. In this figure, lottery spending is treated 
as private expenditure. 
 
16 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Private state spending (excluding lotteries) to total noninterest state speeding, 14 major Indian states, 
1987-88 to 2011-12 
 
 
  
It appears that the role of private goods in public spending is lower in the richer states. For the 
middle income and poorest states, the comparison is not clear, at least not on the basis of simple 
averages.   
 We begin the formal statistical analysis in Table 1 by presenting a fixed effects panel 
regression test of the effect on the three ratios of targeted private government spending to total 
(non-interest) state expenditure arising from changes in real income per capita (Lrypc) and our 
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measure of political competition (Lenpvote).7 These estimates assume that states respond in the 
same way to each variable and differ only in ways that can be captured by differences in their 
intercept. The control variables used to capture complementary reasons for variability in the 
private to public ratio include the fraction of the seats in the legislature reserved for special tribes 
and castes (Lreserve_fraction) and the proportion of the population that is old (Lold).  Increases 
in these proportions are expected to increase private spending targeted at special interest groups 
that traditionally have received special support from the state.  We also include a dummy variable 
for the years in which the governance of state expenditures was taken over by presidential rule 
(Presidential Rule) so that incumbent party expenditure choices favouring special interests were 
supressed. For this reason a negative coefficient is expected.  Table 1 is presented in two parts, 
where the second sub-table shows the effects on the three private spending ratios after adding 
the proportion of the population that is old (60 and over) as an additional control variable.  In 
this regard note that while the addition does very little to the two more general measures of the 
private/public split, the addition of the proportion of older voters is itself significant and does 
significantly improve the fit with the more precise measure of privately targeted public 
expenditures. 
As a general theory explaining the share of privately targeted public spending in the  
noninterest total, the regression results are only modestly successful, providing a somewhat  
stronger explanation of spending choices within each state over time than across states at any  
particular point in time.  On the other hand, the individual hypotheses, as represented by the 
chosen set of covariates, are more successful as explanations of the private/public choices 
                                                          
7 The fixed effects estimator rewrites (14) with 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚, where 𝑖𝑖 indexes the state rather than 𝑎𝑎0. 
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made by state governments with many of the coefficient estimates having their predicted sign 
and being significantly different from zero.  In particular, the ratio of privately targeted to 
general public expenditure is inversely related to real income per capita as expected for all ratio 
measures in both tables and is significantly so in five of the six possible cases.  The results are 
then consistent with prediction 1, the hypothesis that because the cost of using private goods 
to target particular groups of voters becomes increasingly costly as real incomes rise incumbent 
parties will substitute the use of generally provided public goods for privately targeted goods as 
a more efficient way of winning support.  The results also suggest that while there is very little 
difference between the 72 and 59 ratio measures, the coefficients of both 72 and 59 measures 
are significantly smaller than the detailed 87 measure.  This is consistent with our expectation 
that a more precise measure should indicate more of a response to changes in Lrypc.  
The effects of the political competition variable, Lenpvote, on the composition of state 
expenditure are mixed.  In the case of the 72 measure, the result contradicts the proposed 
hypothesis.  On the other hand, the signs of both the 59 and 87 measures are consistent with 
the hypothesis that greater political competition decreases the relative proportion of private 
state provided goods in the budget, with the coefficient of the 59 measure significantly 
different from zero in both forms of the test.  What is also of interest is that in both the 87 and 
59 cases the coefficient estimates of the income and political competition effects are virtually 
identical in size (opposite in sign).  This implies that the point estimates of the elasticity of the 
effects of these variables on the composition of state expenditure are roughly equal.  The 
insignificance of the 87 measure will be returned to shortly when we consider other forms of 
the hypothesis test. 
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The control variables in the fixed effects estimation typically work as expected.  Where 
the coefficient estimates are significant (in 11 of 15 cases) all but two are consistent with their 
predicted sign.  Here the exception is presidential rule in the 59 measure. (in both tables).  
Otherwise the results are consistent with the composition of state expenditures shifting 
towards private spending as the fraction of seats in the legislature reserved for special groups 
increases and the state population ages and with a fall in that ratio when state expenditures are 
taken over under Presidential Rule. 
While the fixed effects estimator used above allows for differences across states to be 
reflected in variations in the equation intercepts, it restricts the coefficient estimates to be 
equal across states and does not distinguish between their long and shorter run effects.  Hence 
in Table 2 we follow Pesaran and Smith (1995) and Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1997) and use the 
Stata xtpmg command to estimate three error correction versions of an autoregressive 
distributed lag (ARDL) model that allow for different variations in the intercepts, slopes  and 
error variances across states and across time.  Because our primary interest is in whether or not 
the hypothesized variables produce long run effects on the composition of state expenditures 
across states, the maximum likelihood pooled mean group regression in column (2) that allow 
intercepts, short run effects and error variances to differ across states while constraining long 
run coefficients to be equal will be the results of primary interest.  The two other approaches 
represent, in column (1), the average coefficient values from running separate states specific 
regressions and, in column (3), a dynamic version of the fixed effects model of column (1) in 
Table 1.  In all three ARDL models we also test for the presence of a real business cycle effect in 
the composition of state expenditures by including a dummy variable (Election Year) that 
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distinguishes the year in which each state election was held.  To the extent that pre-election 
spending targeted at marginal voting groups takes place using state provided private goods, a 
positive effect would be expected. 
There are two striking features that the three sets of equation estimates in Table 2 have 
in common: first, real per capita income has a significantly negative long run effect on the 
proportion of private state expenditures (as expected) in all forms of the test; and, second, all 
forms give evidence of a dynamic process that converges back to the long run estimated for 
each separate model.8  In this sense the empirical work is consistent with the hypothesis that 
maximizing political support can explain at least some of the observed variation in the 
composition of state expenditures and with the more specific hypothesis that rising per capita 
income has made private goods an increasingly costly way of winning electoral support relative 
to the use of general welfare enhancements.  The latter result is robust across the three 
different specifications of how the state actions interact both within and across time.  For the 
individual hypotheses more generally, of the 18 coefficient estimates across the three long run 
models only 2 of these coefficient estimates have the opposite sign and neither estimate is  
significantly different from zero. 
While the individual coefficient estimates differ, sometimes widely, across the three  
models, it is interesting to note that the relative weight given to the different explanatory  
variables is broadly similar across the three equations.  For example, all three equations suggest  
                                                          
8 Note also that the long run coefficient estimates are all significantly larger than the coefficient estimates of the 
fixed effects models of Table 1. 
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that the proportion of the population older than sixty will explain most, and the election year 
least, of the variation in the ratio of private state expenditures.  Similarly all suggest that the 
effect produced by having a higher proportion of reserved seats will outweigh the presence of 
presidential rule and any effect arising from the political business cycle.   
The model used in column (2) assumes that the composition of state expenditures can 
differ in all ways except for their long run relationship produces the best long run fit with the 
data. In that form the long run regression coefficients all have their predicted signs and all are 
significantly different from zero.  Hence increases in per capita income, reductions in ENP 
(greater political competition), fewer seats for special castes and tribes, fewer older persons, 
and being in a nonelection year in a state under presidential rule are all consistent with a lower 
ratio of private good spending in the state budget.  Moreover, to the extent that the pooled 
mean group regression produces more efficient as well as consistent coefficient estimates, an 
increase in political competition (through a decrease in ENP towards 2) is found to have roughly 
half the effect of rising per capita income in reducing the ratio and thus the use of private good 
spending as a method of winning political support.  This in turn suggests that if economic 
welfare rather than electoral support is the desired objective of public policy, then political 
competition becomes complementary with income in promoting a virtuous cycle of growth and 
development.  That is, the analysis suggests that greater political competition and rising per 
capita incomes will tilt government expenditures away from private spending targeted at 
special interest groups to spending in policies designed to improve general welfare.  To the 
extent that such policies are effective in raising incomes, growth becomes endogenous with 
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higher incomes reinforcing the political wisdom of choosing yet more effective welfare 
enhancing policies.  
 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 In this paper we have argued that the relatively large proportion of government  
expenditure that takes the form of private goods going to swing voters and special interest  
groups across Indian states can be explained in part by relatively low levels of per capita income 
in India and the absence of effective political competition, holding constant other demographic 
and cultural differences.  However to the extent that a lower ratio of private good expenditure 
would better promote growth and development, a concern that such spending patterns will 
continue unabated into the future does not seem justified.  Rather our analysis suggests that 
rising incomes and greater effective political competition work hand-in hand to produce better 
policy mix.  Our analysis suggests that even if political parties are only concerned with self-
interest, the desire to win re-election will lead political parties to promote general interest 
policies that are effective.  In doing so they will perpetuate a process that makes further growth 
endogenous.   
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DATA APPENDIX 
The data in the paper covers 14 Indian State, primarily s over the 1987-88 to 2011-12 time 
period.  The 14 states are:  Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya 
Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal.  
 
Measures of the proportion of privately targeted expenditures in state budgets: 
 
Ratio of government consumption to total state expenditures defined as: 
(Private/TotalPublic)59  = (revenue expenditures – debt service charges)/(revenue 
expenditures + capital expenditures – debt service charges).   
These broad categories are available from 1959/60 onward. 
 
Ratio of government spending consumption subcategories available for more targeted spending 
to total state expenditures defined as: 
(Private/TotalPublic)72 = (family welfare + housing + welfare (SC-ST-OBC) + social security 
welfare + nutrition + relief calamities + crop husbandry + animal husbandry + dairy development 
+ fisheries + food nutrition + rural development + civil supplies + state lotteries)/total 
expenditures – pension and interest payments).   
Such detail in state budget accounts is available only from 1972/3 onward. 
 
Ratio of even more tightly defined budget categories from line items from State Government 
accounts that began only in 1987/88: (Private/TotalPublic)87; compiled by Dash and 
Chakraborty from the line item descriptions in state budgets (available only from 1987/88 
onward). 
 
Variable Mnemonics: 
 
Lrypc = Logarithm of real state income per capita; Per capita Net State Domestic Product (NSDP)    
at 2004-2005 constant prices, Central Statistical Organisation (CSO), India. 
 
 
Lreserve_fraction = Logarithm of the share of state seats reserved for special tribes and castes 
Election Commission of India.  
 
Lenpvote = Logarithm of expected number of seats in the state legislature = 1/Herfindahl index 
of party vote shares; Election Commission of India. 
 
Presidential Rule = 1 for years in which operation of the state was taken over under presidential 
rule, 0 otherwise; Election Commission of India. 
 
Lold = Logarithm of the percentage of the population older than 60; Statistical Abstract of India. 
  
Lx = Log(x); D.Lx = first difference of Lx. 
 
Election Year = 1 if a state election was held in that state in that year, 0 otherwise. 
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Table 1 
Fixed Effects Panel Regressions for 14 Indian States:  1987-2011 
(absolute value of t-statistic in bracket below coefficient)  
                                                                                                                             
a) Seats reserved for special tribes and castes and presidential rule as controls. 
Predicted (1) 
(Private/TotalPublic)87 
(2) 
(Private/TotalPublic)72 
(3) 
(Private/TotalPublic)59 
Lrypc                     (-) 
 
-0.087*** 
(4.05) 
-0.024* 
(1.70) 
-0.028*** 
(7.18) 
Lenpvote             (+) 
 
0.070 
(1.18) 
-0.089** 
(2.18) 
0.029*** 
(2.59) 
Lreserve_fraction 
                              (+) 
0.581** 
(2.53) 
0.416*** 
(2.74) 
0.078* 
(1.87) 
Presidential Rule 
                               (-) 
-0.122* 
(2.10) 
0.053 
(1.33) 
0.026** 
(2.40) 
R2 –    within 
- between 
- overall 
0.0717 
0.0203 
0.0232 
0.0655 
0.0001 
0.0004 
0.1794 
0.0592 
0.0123 
F(13,315) 11.86*** 58.14*** 13.70*** 
***,(**), [*], significantly different from zero at 1%, (5%), and [10%] 
 
b) Proportion of the population 60 and older added as a control variable 
Predicted (1) 
(Private/TotalPublic)87 
(2) 
(Private/TotalPublic)72 
(3) 
(Private/TotalPublic)59 
Lrypc                     (-) 
 
-0.195*** 
(5.36) 
-0.023 
(0.90) 
-0.033*** 
(4.82) 
Lenpvote             (+) 
 
0.050 
(0.85) 
-0.089** 
(2.16) 
0.028** 
(2.50) 
Lreserve_fraction 
                              (+) 
0.451* 
(1.98) 
0.418*** 
(2.71) 
0.072* 
(1.70) 
Presidential Rule 
                               (-) 
-0.125** 
(2.22) 
0.053 
(1.33) 
0.026** 
(2.37) 
Lold 
                              (+) 
1.255*** 
(3.65) 
-0.020 
(0.08) 
0.057 
(0.87) 
R2 –    within 
- between 
- overall 
0.1096 
0.0812 
0.0806 
0.0655 
0.0001 
0.0004 
0.1814 
0.0212 
0.0310 
F(13,314) 11.21*** 57.24*** 11.15*** 
***,(**), [*], significantly different from zero at 1%, (5%), and [10%] 
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Table 2  
ARDL Panel State Expenditure Regressions for 14 Indian States:  1987-2011 
(absolute value of t-statistic in bracket below coefficient) 
 
 (1) 
Mean Group 
Estimationt 
(2) 
Pooled Mean Group 
Regression# 
(3) 
Dynamic Fixed 
Effects Regressionz 
Long Run       Predicted (Private/Total)87 (Private/Total)87 (Private/Total)87 
    Lrypc                         (-) 
 
-0.480*** 
(2.70) 
-0.351*** 
(5.37) 
-0.258*** 
(3.43) 
    Lenpvote                 (+) -0.219 
(0.33) 
0.185*** 
(4.05) 
0.126 
(1.07) 
    Lreserve_fraction  (+) 
 
2.203 
(1.13) 
0.540** 
(1.98) 
0.264 
(0.56) 
    Lold                          (+)                         
 
11.98 
(1.13) 
2.40*** 
(4.74) 
2.13*** 
(3.05) 
    Presidential rule     (-) 
 
-0.200* 
(1.46) 
-0.147** 
(2.10) 
-0.282** 
(2.46) 
    Election Year          (+) 
 
-0.043 
(0.57) 
0.092** 
(2.41) 
0.064 
(0.56) 
Short Run        
Error correction term(-) -0.982*** 
(8.77) 
-0.609*** 
(7.77) 
-0.440*** 
(9.06) 
    D.Lrypc 
 
-0.619 
(0.59) 
0.140 
(0.34) 
0.074 
(0.41) 
    D.Lenpvote -0.105 
(0.23) 
-0.239 
(1.15) 
-0.231 
(1.26) 
   D.Lreserve_fraction -1.14 
(0.88) 
0.461 
(0.94) 
0.339 
(0.83) 
    D.Lold 
 
12.36 
(0.75) 
-7.37 
(0.75) 
-4.14 
(1.30) 
    D.Election Year 0.004 
(0.11) 
-0.010 
(0.60) 
0.005 
(0.16) 
    Constant 
 
-16.02 
(0.86) 
1.25*** 
(8.43) 
0.631 
(1.10) 
Log likelihood  190.74  
***,(**), [*], significantly different from zero at 1%, (5%), and [10%]. 
t Under mean group estimation the model is estimated separately for each state and a simple arithmetic average 
of the coefficients is calculated (see Pesaran and Smith, 1995). Here the intercepts, slope and error variances are 
all allowed to differ across states. 
# This maximum likelihood estimator allows the intercept, short-run coefficients, and error variances to differ but 
constrains the long-run coefficients to be equal across states. See Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999). 
Z The dynamic FE estimator restricts the coefficients of the cointegrating vector to be equal across all panels along 
with the speed of adjustment and short run coefficients.  It does, however, allow for state specific intercepts. 
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